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Abstract
It is not unusual for researchers as well as laypersons to refer to the
behavior of noncustodial parents who comply with legally-determined child
support obligations as “cooperative,” even though this term would not typ-
ically be appropriate from the perspective of formal models of expenditures
on public goods [the children in this case]. We develop a model in which
compliance with child support orders is synonymous with cooperative be-
havior. The child support order imposed by institutional agents serves as
focal point for the problem of dividing the gains from cooperation. If the
gains from cooperation exceed the value of noncooperation for both par-
ents, compliance results. The model is estimated using adminstrative data
from the State of Wisconsin. Using model estimates we show that increasing
enforcement activities may have weak eﬀects on the welfare of children of
divorced parents.
∗Partial support for this research was provided by NICHHD Grant HD28409 and by the C.V.
Starr Center for Applied Economics.I have received valuable comments from Kjell Arne Brekke,
Alessandro Cigno, Daniela Del Boca, Douglas Gale, Ken Wolpin, and an anonymous referee, as
well as from participants in seminars at Statistics Norway and the University of Laval.I retain
responsibility for all errors and omissions.1 Introduction
In characterizing the behavior of divorced noncustodial parents under court
orders to make child support transfers to custodial parents, it is not unusual
to hear the claim that parents meeting their legal obligations are behaving
“cooperatively.” When viewing children as (quasi-) public goods, cooper-
ative behavior among divorced parents would typically be taken to imply
that eﬃcient levels of expenditure on the children were made. In this paper,
we develop and estimate a model of compliance with child support orders
a n de x p e n d i t u r e so nc h i l d r e ni nw h i c hc o m p l i a n c ew i t hc h i l ds u p p o r to r d e r s
is synonymous with eﬃcient levels of expenditure on the child.
Of particular interest within our model is the role played by institu-
tional agents, to be thought of as some amalgamation of judges, lawyers,
case workers, and legislators [which for simplicity we will often times refer
to as the judge]. As we will see in the data set utilized in this study, and as
been found in numerous empirical studies on child support transfers, com-
pliance with child support orders is far from perfect. This observation has
led to numerous proposals to increase compliance rates through increased
criminal penalties for noncompliance, automatic withholding of child sup-
port obligations from the noncustodial parent’s paycheck, and others. We
will show that the move from an environment in which institutional agents
have little or no actual enforcement power to one in which their orders are
always carried out does not necessarily lead to increases in expenditures on
children.
In our model, the noncustodial parent is able to choose some level of
money transfer to make to the custodial parent, while the custodial parent
is assumed to make decisions regarding expenditures on the child; both par-
ents have utility functions deﬁned over their own private consumption and
the consumption of the child. The solution to the parents’ problem under
noncooperation can be shown to be unique. Corresponding to any nonco-
operative equilibrium there exists a continuum of cooperative equilibria in
which each parent’s utility will be at least as high as it is in the noncoopera-
tive equilibrium; in any of these equilibria transfers from the noncustodial to
the custodial parent and expenditures on the child will be higher than in the
noncooperative equilibrium. If the child’s welfare is an increasing function
of the expenditures made upon it, the child’s welfare will also be unam-
biguously higher under cooperation than under noncooperation. Divorced
parents are assumed to recognize the potential welfare gain from cooperation
and to trust their ex-spouse to faithfully implement their side of any agreed-
1upon cooperative solution.1 The barrier to implementation of cooperative
solutions is taken to be the choice of the particular cooperative solution to
implement. This problem is potentially solved by the institutional agent in
our model.
W h i l et h ef o c u so ft h ep a p e ri sm o s td e ﬁ n i t e l yo nt h eb e h a v i o ro fd i -
vorced parents, some of the substantive issues we address carry over to the
case of intact families as well. In particular, the problem of the selection
of the particular cooperative solution to implement is one which can also
be expected to impede the implementation of cooperative outcomes even
when parents live together and exhibit some form of altruism toward one
another. Some recent attempts to characterize heterogeneous modes of be-
havior within intact households [e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993)] have
focused on the nature of the relevant threat point in a bargaining formu-
lation as a key behavioral determinant. Their approach expands the scope
of the original bargaining formulations of intrahousehold decision-making
which were developed in Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Hor-
ney (1981). However, all these approaches take as a given that the parents
can agree to a bargaining mechanism to be used to deﬁne the cooperative
solution. This is the problem we explicitly address here.
In a series of papers, Chiappori and his colleagues have developed an
alternative to the bargaining framework within which intrahousehold allo-
cations can be analyzed [see, e.g., Chiappori (1988a,1992), Bourguignon and
Chiappori (1992)]. These authors have essentially made two criticisms of the
bargaining approach: ﬁrst, that it arbitrarily selects one equilibria from the
Pareto frontier based on a particular axiomatic system, and, second, that it
produces no empirically-testable implications [Chiappori (1988b)]. McElroy
(1990) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) have attempted to dispute this
second claim by working out conditions for identiﬁcation, estimation, and
testing in bargaining-theoretic models of household behavior. In response
to the ﬁrst criticism, one may want to think of the assumption of a par-
ticular bargaining framework as an identifying piece of information. In the
alternative empirical approach to household behavior taken in Bourguignon
et al (1994), for example, the assumption of a particular bargaining frame-
work is replaced with a “sharing rule,” the purpose of which it is to select a
unique point on the Pareto frontier. Whether one utilizes a given bargaining
1This “trust” might arise from suitable adaption of folk theorem results when we view
the static model presented here as a stage in a repeated game. See Del Boca and Flinn
(1994a) for a discussion of some of these issues.
2solution or a sharing rule, the assumption is that the parties have agreed
to the use of some mechanism to select a unique outcome among the set of
cooperative equilibria. It is this ability of divorced parents to commit to a
mechanism to divide the rents which we question in this analysis. We think
we have identiﬁed an avenue for resolving this implementation problem.
The starting point for our analysis is the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on the behavior of divorced parents, and most especially Weiss and
Willis (1985), which was the ﬁrst attempt to formally model the behavior of
divorced parents facing the problem of reaching eﬃcient divorce settlements.
The theoretical and empirical work of Del Boca and Flinn (1995) serves as
an important reference point for comparing our model’s implications and
estimates. Perhaps the seminal paper in this area is that of Mnookin and
Kornhauser (1979), who drew attention to the critical role played by legal
and societal institutions in shaping the equilibria outcomes obtained by di-
vorced parents. In one sense, this paper argues that their analysis did not
go far enough -in disputes over the nature of the bargaining mechanism to
be used, the institutional agent must step in to actually suggest a particular
[eﬃcient] outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a
f o r m a ld e s c r i p t i o no ft h eb e h a v i o ro fd i v o r c e dp a r e n t si nt e r m so ft r a n s f e r s
and expenditures on the children under noncooperation and under coopera-
tion. Given the child support order, we then characterize the choice between
the two modes of behavior. In Section 3 we discuss the institutional agent’s
role in leading divorced parents to cooperative equilibria. Section 4 contains
the development of the econometric model used to recover the distribution
of parental preferences in the population of divorced parents. A description
of the data used to estimate the model and estimation results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 contains a welfare analysis, both analytical and em-
pirical, of the eﬀect of switching from a regime of no enforcement of orders
to one of perfect enforcement. Section 7 concludes the paper with some
parting thoughts.
2 Models of Decision-Making Among Divorced Par-
ents
In this section we consider the manner in which divorced parents interact,
particularly with respect to making expenditure decisions on child goods.
We will allow parents the freedom to choose between behaving cooperatively
3or noncooperatively. As we shall use the term throughout the analysis, by
cooperative behavior we mean that eﬃcient levels of expenditure on the
public good, the child, are made.
Because the ultimate goal of our analysis is to perform empirical work, we
will work with simple speciﬁcations of parental preferences. For tractability
and for reasons of comparability with Del Boca and Flinn (1995), we assume
that each parent’s preferences are deﬁned over private consumption, cp,p∈
{m,f}, and the consumption of the child, k, and that these preferences can
be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions
αp ln(cp)+( 1− αp)ln(k),p∈{ m,f}, (1)
where m denotes the mother and f the father, and where each parent’s
preference parameter is contained in the open unit interval.
Our analysis [and data] refer to the case in which the mother has legal
and physical custody of the child, by far the most common custody arrange-
ment in the United States. Given this relationship, we view the mother
as controlling expenditures on the public good, the child. The only way in
which the father can aﬀect the expenditures on the child is through transfers
to the mother. Then the mother’s choice variable is k and the father’s is
t, the transfer to the mother. We now turn to characterizing expenditures
on the child and transfers to the mother from the father when the parents
behave cooperatively and when they do not. In the ensuing discussion the





We ﬁrst determine expenditures on the child and transfers from the non-
custodial to the custodial parent assuming noncooperative behavior. Even
though the model is static, it is useful to think of decision-making as pro-
ceeding sequentially: given a transfer from the father, the mother decides
how much to spend on the public good. [We will often refer to the noncus-
todial parent as the father and the custodial parent as the mother since this
is the actual assignment in the vast majority of sole-custody cases.] The
fathers use their knowledge of the mother’s decision rule in deciding upon
the size of the transfer to make. Conditional on the father’s transfer, the
mother solves the problem
max
k∈[0,ym+t]
αmln(ym + t − k)+( 1− αm)ln(k), (2)
4and the mother’s decision rule for expenditures on the child given the trans-
fer is simply
k∗
N(ym + t)=( 1− αm)(ym + t). (3)
Given the mother’s demand function for child goods, the father’s problem
is to choose the level of the transfer to make to her. His decision rule is given
by:
t∗
N(ym,y f)=a r g m a x
t∈[0,yf]
αf ln(yf − t)+( 1− αf)ln(k∗
N(ym +t)). (4)
This rule can be explicitly stated as follows. Deﬁne the variable τ(ym,y f)=






0 ⇔ τ(ym,y f) ≤ 0
τ(ym,y f) ⇔ τ(ym,y f) > 0
. (5)
It is easy to show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium to this
Stackelberg game, namely ( k, t)(ym,y f), where  k(ym,y f)=( 1− αm)(ym +
t∗
N(ym,y f)) and  t(ym,y f)=t∗
N(ym,y f). The value of the mother’s and fa-
ther’s utility maximization problems under noncooperation are then
V N
m (ym,y f)=αm ln(ym− k(ym,y f)+ t(ym,y f))+(1−αm)ln( k(ym,y f)) (6)
and
V N
f (ym,y f)=αf ln(yf −  t(ym,y f)) + (1 − αf)ln( k(ym,y f)), (7)
respectively.
2.2 Cooperative Behavior
Due to the fact that expenditures on children are public goods, it is pos-
sible to increase the welfare of both parents (and the child, given that his
or her welfare is an increasing function of his or her own consumption) if a
cooperative equilibrium can be implemented. Any cooperative equilibrium
will have the father transfer an amount greater than  t(ym,y f)t ot h em o t h e r
and will have the mother spend more than  k(ym,y f) on the child. While
the noncooperative equilibrium in this model is unique, there exist a contin-
uum of cooperative equilibria. The problem of the selection of a particular
5cooperative equilibrium to implement is the topic of the following section.
In this section we merely characterize the set of cooperative equilibria in a
manner which will be useful for the econometric model which we develop
below.
The Pareto frontier of cooperative welfare levels can be traced out in
the following manner. Imagine that one of the parents, say the mother, has
the ability to select both k and t, though her choices are constrained by the
condition that the father obtains a welfare level of at least  Vf .T h e nt h i s
pseudo-choice problem of the mother can be represented by
 Vm(ym,y f,  Vf)=m a x
k,t
αm ln(ym + t − k)+( 1− αm)ln(k)( 8 )
s.t. αf ln(yf −t)+( 1− αf)ln(k) ≥  Vf,
where  Vf is some predetermined constant which is to be thought of [for
now] as the utility level guaranteed to the father using some unspeciﬁed
mechanism which determines the division of the surplus from cooperation.
The lower bound for this utility level is taken to be the utility he achieves
by not cooperating, V N
f (ym,y f). Given the strict concavity of the parental
utility functions, it is not diﬃcult to demonstrate that the constraint in
[8] will always be binding, and that the mother’s welfare is a monotone
decreasing function of the guaranteed welfare level of the father.2 The max-
imum amount of welfare the father can achieve under cooperation is that
level which would yield the mother exactly her noncooperative utility level.
Then deﬁne the father’s maximum utility, ¯ V C




m (ym,y f); then the father’s realizable value of cooperation must satisfy
V C
f ∈ [V N
f ,V
C
f ], where the dependencies on the parental income distribution
have been dropped for notational simplicity.
We can solve for the cooperative levels of transfers and child good ex-
penditures as a function of the parental income distribution and the division
of the surplus from cooperation [represented by V C
f ] as follows. Since the
welfare constraint on the pseudo-choice problem [8] solved by the mother is
binding, we can write the constraint as
αf ln(yf − t)+( 1− αf)ln(k)=V C
f (9)
2Assume the converse, so that the mother makes choices of k and t such that Uf(yf −
t,k) >V
C
f . By increasing t and holding ﬁxed k the mother can increase her own welfare
by reducing the father’s, so the original allocation could not have been optimal.
6⇒ yf − t = exp(V C
f /αf)k−η
⇒ t = yf − R(V C
f )k−η,
where η ≡ (1−αf)/αf and R(V C
f ) ≡ exp(V C
f /αf). Substituting this expres-
sion into the mother’s utility function and solving for child goods expendi-
tures yields
kC(ym,y f,VC
f ) = argmax
k
[αm ln(ym − k + yf − R(V C
f )k−η)+( 1− αm)ln(k)]
=a r g m a x
k
[αm ln(yt − k − R(V C
f )k−η)+( 1− αm)ln(k)],
where yt ≡ yf +ym is total parental income. Thus the equilibrium expendi-
ture level on the public good is given by the implicit function
kC(V C
f )=( 1− αm)yt − R(V C
f )J[kC(V C
f )]−η, (10)
where J ≡ (1−αm(1+η)) = 1−αm
αf . We note that the equilibrium cooperative
expenditure level on the child may be increasing or decreasing in the father’s









> 0 ⇔ αm <α f,
with the partial derivative equal to 0 if parental preferences are identical.
Equilibrium transfers from the father to the mother can be written
tC(V C
f )=yf −R(V C
f )[kC(V C
f )]−η.















opposite of the sign of J
7We know that in cooperative equilibrium




Substituting this expression into [10], we ﬁnd
kC(V C











The expression given in [12] will turn out to be an extremely useful one
-it gives the relationship between transfers, parental incomes, and expen-
ditures by the mother on the child along the Pareto frontier. In Figure 1
we plot some examples of this linear function for a ﬁxed parental income
distribution (ym,y f); in this example we have set each parental income equal
to its mean value in the sample, so that ym =5 .56 and yf =1 1 .46.3 There
are four cases represented in Figure 1, which correspond to four diﬀerent
pairs of parental preference parameters. In Figures 1.a and 1.d, parental
weights on private consumption are the same; in Figure 1.a the common
private consumption weight is .6 and in Figure 1.d it is .8. In these two
cases, the cooperative level of child expenditures on the child is independent
of the transfer from the father to the mother [since θ3 = 0 in this case]. In
Figure 1.b, the mother values child expenditures more than the father [im-
plying θ3 > 0]. The negative slope of the cooperative expenditure function
in Figure 1.c results from the fact that αm <α f in this case.
The set of transfers which could be observed in cooperative equilibrium
is indicated on the horizontal axis of each graph. The size and location of
this set varies greatly across the four examples. Comparing the cases in
which αm = αf, the “cooperative” set of transfers is the interval [3.47,5.44]
when αp = .6 [Figure 1.a], but shifts down to the interval [1.21,4.27] when
both parents are relatively more selﬁsh [αp = .8, Figure 1.d]. Comparing the
cases in which one parent has an own-consumption utility weight of .6 and
the other has an own-consumption utility weight of .8, we can see that the
3These represent monthly income ﬁgures expressed in 100s of 1980 dollars. Further
descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Section 5.
8cooperation sets depend critically on the identity of the more-selﬁsh parent.
When the mother is more selﬁsh [Figure 1.c], the set of cooperative transfers
is [4.09,6.90]; when the father is more selﬁsh [Figure 1.b], the set shifts down
to the interval [.79,3.21]. The variability in the cooperative sets of transfers,
conditional on the observed parental income distribution, is one of the focal
points of our analysis.
Before turning to the issue of the how divorced parents can be induced
to cooperate, for future reference it will be useful to give a characterization
of the cooperative solution to this public goods problem. Condition on a
level of transfers from the father to the mother, ˆ t. Then use the relation
given in [12] to deﬁne a level of welfare for each parent associated with the
transfer of ˆ t a n de x p e n d i t u r e so nt h ec h i l do fˆ k(ˆ t)=θ1yf +θ2ym+θ3ˆ t. Then
deﬁne the welfare level of the father given ˆ t by
ˆ Vf(ˆ t;ym,y f)=αf ln(yf − ˆ t)+( 1− αf)ln(ˆ k(ˆ t)),
and the welfare level of the mother by
ˆ Vm(ˆ t;ym,y f)=αm ln(ym + ˆ t − ˆ k(ˆ t)) + (1 − αm)ln(ˆ k(ˆ t)),
where ˆ Vp is equal to −∞ when any argument in the utility function has a
negative value. Then, given ˆ t, two divorced parents with a given income dis-
tribution will cooperate if and only if both of the following weak inequalities
are satisﬁed
ˆ Vf(ˆ t;ym,y f) ≥ V N
f (ym,y f), (13)
ˆ Vm(ˆ t;ym,y f) ≥ V N
m (ym,y f).
Given ˆ t, ym, and yf, we deﬁne C(ˆ t,ym,y f)a st h es e to fp a i r so f( αm,α f)s u c h
that [13] is satisﬁed. Thus, C(ˆ t,ym,y f)i st h es e to fp r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r
pairs for which a cooperative equilibrium with transfers ˆ t and child good
expenditures ˆ k(ˆ t) exists. The set C ﬁgures prominently in the remainder of
the paper; further characteristics of C are discussed in the following section.
3 Implementing Cooperative Solutions
We argue that even when institutional agents have little enforcement power,
indeed, even when they have none, they still can play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the form of the interaction between divorced parents. There
9are many well-known problems connected with the implementation of co-
operative solutions; here we focus on one often not emphasized and ignore
other more commonly-discussed issues. In particular, we will view divorced
parents as being willing to behave cooperatively and as being trustful that
their ex-spouse will implement any mutually-agreed to cooperative equilib-
rium. The problem upon which we wish to focus concerns the selection of a
particular cooperative equilibrium. While there currently exists a method-
ological debate in the literature on intra-household bargaining [within intact
households] on the proper way to estimate demand systems when the equi-
librium outcome can in principle lie anywhere on the Pareto frontier, it is
always assumed that the participants in the bargaining problem are able
to choose an unique outcome or at least agree to the use of a mechanism
which chooses it for them. We see this problem, particularly in the context
of nonintact households, as being fundamental. We view the institutional
agent as potentially being able to resolve this issue by “suggesting” a given
allocation indirectly through the child support order. That is, let a point on
the Pareto frontier be associated with a transfer of ˆ t and child-good expen-
ditures of ˆ k. Let the institutional agent’s child support order s represent ˆ t,
so that when the father transfers s the mother’s level of expenditure on the
child will be ˆ k(s). The “judge” then serves as a sort of “focal arbitrator” in
the language of Myerson (1991, p. 111), who goes on to state:
[W]e say that an individual is a focal arbitrator if he can de-
termine the focal equilibrium in a game by publicly suggesting
to the players that they should all implement this equilibrium.
Even though his suggestion may have no binding force, if each
player believes that every other player will accept the arbitra-
tor’s suggestion, then each player will ﬁnd it best to do as the
arbitrator suggests, provided that the arbitrator’s suggestion is
an equilibrium. Thus, a game with a large set of equilibria is a
game in which an arbitrator or social planner can substantially
inﬂuence players’ behavior.
An institutional agent having this role then “suggests” a particular co-
operative equilibrium implicitly by announcing a child support order s.T h e
parents determine whether or not the pair (ˆ k(s),s) implies utility values
which lie on the Pareto frontier.4 If they do, then this particular coopera-
4Recall that we are only considering cooperative equilibria in which eﬃcient expendi-
tures on the child good are made, i.e., those (k,t) equilibria which produce utility realiza-
10tive equilibrium is the one which is implemented. If (ˆ k(s),s)i sn o tc o n s i s -
tent with a cooperative equilibrium, then a noncooperative equilibrium is
observed. In either case then, cooperative or not, since the focal arbitrator
suggests only one value of s, the observed equilibrium outcome is unique.
Under the model structure, we know that a cooperative equilibrium was
implemented if the child support transfer is exactly equal to the order. If
this is not the case, then the equilibrium is noncooperative.5,6
Under this interpretation of the interaction between divorced parents
and institutional agents, it is easy to understand our concern with the set
C(ˆ t,ym,y f) deﬁned above. After replacing ˆ t with s, the set C(s,ym,y f)d e -
ﬁnes all pairs of preference parameters (αm,α f) which are consistent with
the parents “accepting” the suggestion of the judge and implementing the co-
operative equilibrium. Some examples of the shape of this set are contained
in Figure 2. Figure 2.a contains the plot of C for the case in which each of
the three arguments have been set at their mean value in the sample. Figure
2.b plots C evaluated at the 10th percentile of the sample distribution for
each argument, and Figure 2.c plots C with each argument corresponding
to the 90th percentile of the sample distribution. In all cases the shapes of
the cooperation set C are similar. There is some suggestion of nonconvexity,
though this poses no problems for our estimation procedures or inference.
The set C in the examples is always connected, and in fact it is possible
to prove that C has this property for all values of the triple (s,ym,y f).7
We note that the size of the sets C, as measured by area, varies somewhat
across the three examples. [The size of C can also be viewed as the proba-
bility of compliance when the preference parameters are jointly distributed
tions which lie on the Pareto frontier.
5There are values of the preference parameters of the two parents for which the nonco-
operative equilibrium transfer would be exactly equal to the child support order. In such
a case, one could not distinguish between the cooperative and noncooperative regimes.
However, this set of preference parameters is of measure zero, and thus ignoring it poses
no danger with respect to misspeciﬁcation of the econometric model.
6Myerson’s focal arbitrator facilitates selection of a particular noncooperative equi-
librium from a multiplicity of possible noncooperative equilibria. Our focal arbitrator
attempts to assist parents in selecting an eﬃcient equilibrium from a continuum of such
equilbria. If our focal arbitrator “fails,” due to imperfect information regarding parental
preferences, the result is a uniquely-determined noncooperative equilibrium. It is not clear
what “failure” of a focal arbitrator would imply in the Myerson context.
7While connectedness may be a pleasing property for C to possess, all of our estimation
procedures and policy experiments would be valid even if C was not connected. This is
potentially important if one wished to estimate the model under alternative utility function
speciﬁcations which may produce sets C which are not connected.
11as independent uniform random variates on [0,1]2.]
To illustrate the sizeable gains in child expenditure associated with coop-
erative outcomes, in Figure 3 we plot expenditures on the child as a function
of the preference parameters of the parents for “average” sample parents.
Expenditures on the child are greatest when neither parent values private
consumption [i.e., αm =0a n dαf =0 ] , where k = Im + If. The surface
smoothly decreases as we move away from that point until we reach the set
of points contained in C, at which point the surface displays the noticeable
bulge produced by the relatively high levels of child good expenditure as-
sociated with cooperation. As the “selﬁshness” of the parents continues to
i n c r e a s e ,w em o v eo u to ft h es e tC and back into the low levels of expenditure
associated both with selﬁshness and noncooperation.
There are a number of possible criticisms one can level against the con-
ceptual framework utilized here. We discuss them and attempt to justify
the equilibrium concept we employ in the context of the following example.
Consider the case in which the parents have identical utility functions8 given
by
Up = .767ln(cp)+.233ln(k),
and let the parents have the mean incomes in the sample, ym =5 .56 and
yf =1 1 .46. The noncooperative equilibrium would have the father transfer
nothing to the mother, since .233yf +.767ym < 0. With a transfer of 0, the
mother sets k∗
N =( .233)(5.56) = 1.295. Thus the noncooperative equilibrium
is (t∗
N =0 ,k∗
N =1 .295). In the noncooperative equilibrium, the father’s
equilibrium utility level is V N
f = .767ln(11.46) + .233ln(1.295) = 1.931,
while the mother’s equilibrium utility level is V N
m = .767ln(5.56 − 1.295) +
.233ln(1.295) = 1.173.
From [12], we know that when the preference parameters of the two
parents are identical the cooperative level of expenditures on the child is
ﬁxed at kC =( 1− αp)(ym + yf)=3 .966. The maximum level of transfers
associated with a cooperative equilibrium is given by
V N
f = αp ln(yf −t)+( 1− αp)ln(kC)






8The preference parameter values correspond to the estimated average levels of αm and
αf from Speciﬁcation 3 below.
12The minimal level of transfers associated with a cooperative equilibrium
occurs at the point where the father gets the entire surplus, or
V N
m = αp ln(ym − kC + t)+( 1− αp)ln(kC)






Then under our model structure, a cooperative outcome will occur when-
ever s ∈ (1.443,3.301). Beginning in the mid-1980s in Wisconsin, order
guidelines speciﬁed that a noncustodial divorced parent of one child should
pay 17% of their gross income to the custodial parent. In our case, this
guideline would have resulted in an order of (.17)(11.46) = 1.948, which is
an element of the “cooperation set” in this case. Therefore, given this order,
our modeling assumptions result in a cooperative equilibrium of (t = s =
1.948,ˆ k(s)=3 .966).
It may be objected that other reasonable equilibria also exist. There
exists an uncountable set Ψ consisting of pairs (t,k) which yield utility
outcomes which Pareto dominate those associated with the noncooperative
equilibrium, yet do not lie on the Pareto frontier. Parents facing the choice
of implementation of some (t,k) ∈ Ψ or the noncooperative pair (t∗
N,k∗
N)
would always opt for the former. For example, one alternative equilibrium
framework which also produces a unique equilibrium is the following. As
above, assume that whenever (αm,α f) ∈ C(s,ym,y f) the noncooperative
equilibrium is not implemented. After receiving the amount s from the fa-
ther, the mother chooses an expenditure level on the child suﬃcient to make
the father no worse oﬀ then he would be in the noncooperative equilibrium.9
Then the mother solves
max
k
αln(ym + s − k)+( 1−α)ln(k)( 1 4 )
s.t. αln(yf −s)+( 1−α)ln(k) ≥ V N
f .
Let the solution to [14] be denoted k∗∗. Since the constraint will always be
binding, we have k∗∗ = exp((V N
f − αln(yf − s))/(1 − α)). In our example,
k∗∗ =2 .393.
9One might think of this constraint on her choice as arising in the context of a repeated
game, in which case failure to ensure that the father is at least as well oﬀ transferring s as
behaving noncooperatively in any period would result in noncooperative behavior in all
future periods.
13There are some interesting diﬀerences and similarities between this al-
ternative equilibrium framework and the one utilized in this paper. First,
by construction, in both cases the event t = s signals that a noncooperative
equilibrium was not implemented. However, in the case of “cooperation,”
k∗∗ ≤ ˆ k(s). In our example, k∗∗ is 84.7 percent greater than k∗
N, b u ti s4 0
percent less than ˆ k(s) − thus there are large diﬀerences in the distribu-
tions of gains from cooperation under the two equilibrium concepts. Given
that (αm,α f) ∈ C(s,ym,y f), under the alternative equilibrium concept,
mothers do better, children worse, and fathers much worse. In fact, under
the alternative equilibrium fathers would be indiﬀerent between coopera-
tive and noncooperative outcomes, which raises some questions as to the
implementability of such an equilibrium.10
In the absence of data on expenditure levels k, it is not possible to em-
pirically investigate which of these two equilibrium structures, if either, ade-
quately captures the observed dependencies among the variables referenced
by the model: ym,y f,t,k. In the estimation of household bargaining mod-
els [for intact families], the assumption of eﬃciency is key to identiﬁcation
of model parameters.11 In the end, we have chosen to use an equilibrium
framework which also imposes this condition, though the reader should bear
in mind that the likely gains from cooperative behavior [in terms of expen-
ditures on the public good] are larger than they would be if we also allowed
for the implementation of cooperative equilibria which were not eﬃcient.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of an important issue,
the determination of the ordered amount s. In the context of noncoopera-
tive equilibria, a best response of each agent is to behave according to the
“suggested” equilibrium as long as they believe all the other agents will do
likewise. In the case of the choice over cooperative equilibria, the best re-
sponse argument needs to be modiﬁed somewhat. If we consider the model
in the context of a repeated game to which Folk Theorem results apply,
then implementing the particular cooperative outcome selected by (ˆ k(s),s)
whenever (αm,α f) ∈ C(s,ym,y f) is a best response if the only alternative
10To ensure participation of the father in the alternative cooperative equilibrium, the
mother could increase spending on the child to k
∗∗+ε, where ε is some arbitrarily small pos-
itive amount. This solves the participation problem at the cost of introducing nonunique-
ness through the indeterminancy of ε.
11In the two main approaches taken to the estimation of these models, the cooperative
allocation of expenditures is assumed to be associated with Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. A
speciﬁc point on the frontier is chosen through the use of either a Nash Bargaining model
or by adding a “sharing rule” which uniquely divides the cooperative surplus.
14is the noncooperative outcome. This is true no matter how the amount s is
determined. The only requirement we impose on the determination of s is
that it be exogenous [i.e., not subject to the inﬂuence of the parents].12 As
is the case in most states currently, child support orders are typically issued
under strict guidelines, which express order amounts as simple functions of
the income of the noncustodial [and sometimes the custodial] parent and
the number of children. Orders deﬁned in this manner clearly satisfy our
exogeneity condition.
4 Econometric Model
All divorced parents in our sample are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas utility
functions as given in [1]. While we do not observe expenditures on the
child, we do observe transfers. Given the parental incomes ym and yf, if an
order is exactly complied with we learn that parental preference parameters
belong to the cooperation set, C(s,ym,y f). If the transfer is not equal to the
order, we learn something about the father’s preference parameter αf, and
conditional on this information we learn something about the mother’s value
of αm. In particular, if we know the exact value of αf in the noncooperative
case, we know that the mother’s value of αm must be such that the parents
did not choose to cooperate. We now derive the likelihood function for the
model in detail.
Conditional on the child support order, the function of interest to us
is the joint distribution of the preference parameters of the divorced moth-
ers and fathers. Denote this distribution by F(αm,α f;θ), where θ is an
unknown vector-valued parameter which completely characterizes the cu-
mulative distribution function F; we further assume that F is continuously
diﬀerentiable everywhere on [0,1]2 with the density of F given by f. Each
pair of divorced parents have preference weights which are draws from F.
It is reasonable to assume that these draws are independent across pairs of
divorced parents. The assumption that each set of parents draw their pref-
erence weights from the same distribution essentially is made for purposes of
identiﬁcation. The likelihood function is formed on the basis of this random
sampling assumption.
To describe the construction of the likelihood, it seems worthwhile to dis-
tinguish three cases. Case A is deﬁned by transfers being strictly positive,
12If s were endogenously determined, we would expect cooperative behavior always to
be the end result.
15but not equal to the ordered amount. This case includes both positive trans-
fer levels less than the ordered amount and those greater than the ordered
amount. Case B obtains when there is no transfer from the noncustodial
parent to the custodial parent. Case C is deﬁned as the cooperative case,
in which child support transfers are exactly equal to orders.
Case A: t>0,t= s.
When t = s, we know that the equilibrium is noncooperative, so that
t h et r a n s f e rt h a tt h ef a t h e rm a k e st ot h em o t h e ri sg i v e nb y
t =( 1− αf)yf − αfym. (15)






Now the joint density of the transfer made by the father and the preference
parameter of the mother is given by
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Given t = s, we know the value of αf and we know that, conditional on
that value, the mother’s preference parameter is not contained in the set
















where χ denotes the indicator function which assumes the value 1 when the
logical statement is true and otherwise is equal to 0.
Case B: t =0 .
In this situation we only know that the noncooperative equilibrium is
one in which the father would choose to make no transfer to the mother.





16Furthermore, for any value of αf which satisﬁes this inequality, the value of
the mother’s preference parameter must not be contained in the cooperation







χ[(αm,α f) / ∈ C(s,ym,y f)]f(αm,α f;θ)dαm dαf.
(21)
Note that the lower limit of integration for the father’s preference parameter
is the right-hand side of [20]
Case C: t = s.
In this case, the fact that the parents are cooperating indicates that their
preference parameters are contained in the set C(s,ym,y f). The probability






χ[(αm,α f) ∈ C(s,ym,y f)]f(αm,α f;θ)dαmdαf.
(22)












where SJ denotes the set of sample members belonging to “class” J, J =
A,B,C, and where individual subscripts have been omitted for simplicity.
Estimation proceeds by ﬁrst choosing a parametric family of distributions F
with support [0,1]2. Once the family of distributions is chosen, the parameter
space for θ, denoted Θ, is deﬁned. The maximum likelihood estimator for θ
is then deﬁned by ˆ θ =a r gm a x θ∈Θ ln(L). Given the parametric distributions
we have chosen, the usual regularity assumptions are satisﬁed so that the
consistency and asymptotic normality of ˆ θ is assured.
The model presented is undeniably a highly-structured one; it more or
less has to be given our ambitious goal of identifying parental parameters
based only on the relationship between child support orders and transfers.
In such a situation, it is likely that the inferences we may draw concerning
the distribution of parental preferences could be sensitive to the families of
distributions we choose to estimate. To informally examine the sensitivity
issue, and to learn something of a pragmatic nature concerning identiﬁca-
tion, we estimated the model under a variety of assumptions on F.
17In total we estimated six diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model, some of
which were special cases of the others. The ﬁrst and second speciﬁcations
estimated were based on the power function distribution, and were pred-
icated on the independence of αm and αf. The power function p.d.f. for
parent p is given by
fp(αp;θp)=θpαθp−1
p ,θ p > 0,p= m,f. (24)
In speciﬁcation 1 we assume that the parameter θm = θf. In speciﬁcation 2
we allow these parameters to be diﬀerent.
In speciﬁcations 3 and 4 we continue to maintain the assumption that
the parental preference parameters are independently distributed, and we
assume that at least one parental preference parameter is distributed as a













p (1 − αp)θ2
p−1,θ 1
p > 0,θ 2
p > 0. (25)
Speciﬁcation 3 is based on the assumption that the preference parameters





f). In speciﬁcation 4 we originally attempted to
allow both parents to have preference parameters which followed diﬀerent
Beta distributions, but found that the log likelihood was ill-behaved in this
case.13 In response, we assumed that the father’s preference parameter
was distributed according to a Beta with the mother’s preference parameter
distributed according to a (one-parameter) power function distribution.
Our ﬁnal family of distributional assumptions was based on the bivari-
ate normal. Assume that (xm xf) is drawn from the bivariate normal p.d.f.
fBV N(x;µ,Σ), where µ denotes the mean vector and Σ denotes the covari-
ance matrix of the vector x.T h e nd e ﬁ n e
αp =
exp(xp)
1+e x p ( xp)
,p= m,f.














13We shall discuss our interpretation of this phenomenon when we present the results
in the following section.
18This speciﬁcation allows us to relax the independence assumption on the
parental preference parameters in a tractable way. The bivariate p.d.f. [26]
has ﬁve parameters, two in the mean vector µ and three in the covariance
matrix
	
. Not unsuprisingly we found that it was not possible to estimate
all these parameters without further restrictions. We decided to restrict
the marginal distributions of the preference draws to be identical, so that
µm = µf and σ2
m = σ2
f. We impose this restriction in both speciﬁcations
5 and 6. In addition, speciﬁcation 5 imposes the independence restriction
σm,f =0 . The parameter σm,f is unrestricted in speciﬁcation 6.
5Data and Estimation Results
The data used to estimate the model are identical to those which were used
in Del Boca and Flinn (1995). Besides the fact that these are relatively
unique, high quality administrative data, it is also of interest to see to what
extent estimates of parental preferences diﬀer across the two quite diﬀerent
modeling frameworks. Del Boca and Flinn (1995) viewed the parents as
always behaving noncooperatively; in their model, the noncustodial agent
only complied with child support orders when the noncompliance “cost” was
suﬃciently great. Del Boca and Flinn present estimates of the distribution
of father’s preference parameters and the cost of noncompliance distribution;
in that model, the distribution of mother’s preference parameters was not
identiﬁed. In contrast, under the current speciﬁcation the joint distribution
of the preference parameters of mothers and fathers is identiﬁed. Thus
in both models we can identify the marginal distribution of the father’s
preference parameter, and we will compare our estimates of this distribution.
The data consist of 222 divorce cases adjudicated in the years 1980-1982
in the State of Wisconsin. The original sample was drawn from court records
involving divorce and paternity cases in 18 counties in the state. The ﬁnal
sample we utilize is a small portion of the original sample, which is due to
extensive amounts of missing data in the original records and the stringent
inclusion criteria we specify. In particular, we have included only divorce
cases in which one child was involved, the mother was awarded sole legal and
physical custody, and a child support order was in eﬀect. The data consists
of the reported monthly income of the mother and the father at the time
of the ﬁnal divorce stipulation,14 and the child support order and recorded
14When the reported monthly income for either parent was less than $280, we set it equal
to $280. Our reasoning was that potential welfare beneﬁts or minimum wage employment
19payment in the ﬁfth month after the child support order took eﬀect. We
choose the ﬁfth month so as to minimize start up problems which may have
existed in the administrative recording system. The reported transfers in
the ﬁfth month of the order period were adjusted for a small number of
cases when we deemed them likely to be mismeasured.15 All variables are
measured in terms of 1980 dollars.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 1; each entry
for a variable reports the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for
the sample or a particular subsample. We ﬁrst note (from the bottom line
of the table) that the majority of cases are either transferring nothing or are
transferring exactly the ordered amount. Each of these groups represents
about three-eighths of the sample. The remainder of the sample is almost
evenly split between cases in which the father transfers a positive amount
that is less than the order and cases in which he transfers more than the
ordered amount.
The ﬁrst column contains mean and standard deviations of the variables
for the entire sample. We note that the mean income of the fathers is about
twice as high as the mean income of the mothers. The average order is
about 20 percent of the average income of fathers, while average transfers are
about 13 percent of the average income of the father. There is substantial
dispersion in the incomes of the fathers. This is in large part due to the
presence of an outlier; the income value reported for this case, while large,
is believable. We should also bear in mind that these are data which were
reported to the court and that fathers had no reason to inﬂate their income
reports.
There don’t exist many striking diﬀerences in the means or standard de-
viations of the variables across payment groups. For the group comprised of
fathers who transfer more than the ordered amount, which contains the out-
lier mentioned above, the mean income of fathers is high, certainly relative
to the average child support award. For the group of individuals who pay
exactly the ordered amount, the mean income of both parents is higher than
could have yielded at least this level of income. This adjustment was made for 21.6 percent
of the mothers and 1.3 percent of the fathers.
15A description of the adjustment procedure appears in Del Boca and Flinn (1995,
p. 1253). Essentially, we recorded individuals as exactly complying with the order in
the ﬁfth month if (i) t5 = s5;( i i )t4 + t5 = s4 + s5; (iii) t5 + t6 = s5 + s6;o r( i v )
t4 + t5 + t6 = s4 + s5 + s6, where tj and sj denote the payments and orders in month j
in the order period. Our reasoning was that if any of these conditions held, it was likely
that the father was attempting to pay the ordered amount in the ﬁfth month, and that
the monthly transfer was misrecorded into an adjacent month or months.
20the corresponding mean for the entire sample. Mean orders for this group
are close to the mean for the entire sample. The group with the highest
average orders are the “partial compliers,” that is, those cases in which the
father makes positive transfers but for less than the ordered amount. We
also note that in this case both mean parental incomes are the lowest across
the four groups. For the cases in which the father made no transfer, average
values across orders and parental incomes are not very diﬀerent than they
are in the entire sample, though they are slightly lower for each of the three
variables.
Table 2 contains estimates of the six model speciﬁcations described in
the previous section. To enhance interpretation, we also present graphs
of all the estimated marginal densities of the preference parameters of the
parents; Figure 4 contains graphs of the preference parameter densities for
the model speciﬁcations in which the distributions of preference parameters
are restricted to be the same, and Figure 5 contains plots of the preference
parameter densities when these densities are not restricted to be identical for
mothers and fathers. Table 3 contains reports of the implied ﬁrst and second
moments of the preference parameter distributions and some measures of
model ﬁt.
In speciﬁcation 1 the preference parameter draws of mothers and fathers
are assumed to come from the same power function distribution, and the
draws are assumed to be independent. The estimated density appears in
F i g u r e4 . a .W ec a ns e et h a tt h em a s si sc o n c e n t r a t e do nt h er i g h ts i d eo ft h e
support of the distribution; formal tests decidedly reject the null hypothesis
that the density is uniform, for example. From Table 3 we learn that the
mean private consumption weight (αp) is .751, and the standard deviation
of the distribution is .193.
Under speciﬁcation 2 we continue to assume that the parents take inde-
pendent draws from a power function distribution, but relax the assumption
that the two distributions are identical. The graphs of the two marginal den-
sities appear in Figures 5.a and 5.b. We see that the mother’s density has
substantially more mass in the right side of the support than does the fa-
ther’s. The mean private consumption weight for the mothers is now .836 as
o p p o s e dt o. 7 5 0f o rt h ef a t h e r s ,w h i c ho nt h ef a c eo fi tw o u l di n d i c a t et h a t
mothers tend to be less altruistic than fathers, a somewhat surprising result.
However, we will argue that the identiﬁcation of the mother’s preference pa-
rameter distribution using only the data available to us is quite tenuous. In
this case, their is strong evidence for this claim if we note the large standard
error associated with the point estimate of the parameter δm [reported in
21Table 2 under speciﬁcation 2]. A likelihood ratio test of speciﬁcation 2 ver-
sus 1 produces a test statistic of 2.282, which has a probability of .131 under
the null hypothesis that δm = δf. Thus there is no statistical evidence that
the marginal distributions of preference parameters diﬀer across the parents
when we restrict attention to the power function distribution.
Heuristically speaking, the practical identiﬁcation issue concerning the
recovery of the mothers’ preference parameter distribution relates to the de-
pendent variables over which the likelihood function is deﬁned. There are
really two dependent variables in the model, conditional on the order and
the parental income distribution, which are the transfer and child expendi-
tures. When the transfer made is not equal to the support order, little is
learned concerned the mothers’ preference parameter distribution, though
especially for cases of partial compliance or when more is transferred than is
ordered, we learn a substantial amount about the distribution of the father’s
parameter. It is never possible to recover the exact value of the preference
parameter for the mother; in all cases, conditional on the size of the trans-
fer, we can only assign the mother’s parameter value to a relatively large
set. This makes it diﬃcult to learn the details of this distribution, espe-
cially given the modest sample size with which we are working. Clearly
it would be possible to increase the precision with which we estimate the
joint distribution of parental preferences if information both on transfers and
expenditures on the child good were available. Unfortunately, there is no na-
tionally representative data set available which has high quality information
on both of these choice variables.16
In speciﬁcation 3 we assumed that parental draws were independent,
with both being generated from the same Beta distribution. The Beta nests
the power function distribution (when δ2
p =1 ) , so ﬁrst we were interested
in determining whether speciﬁcation 3 provided a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt of
the data than did speciﬁcation 1. The likelihood ratio test statistic for
this comparison is 3.968, which has a probability of .046 under the null
hypothesis that δ2
p =1 . Especially given the modest sample size, we took
this as evidence in support of the Beta assumption. We can see from the
16In 1987 the NLS72 questionaire contained a special module for divorced parents in
the sample. Information was collected on custody type, visitation rates, incomes of the
parents, child support orders and payments time-aggregated over a year, and some in-
formation on the frequency with which the noncustodial parent made various types of
child-good expenditures. The expenditure information collected is relatively crude, and,
more importantly, no information is available on the expenditures of the custodial parent.
See Weiss and Willis (1993) for a detailed description and use of these data.
22comparison of Figures 4.a and 4.c that the estimated density noticeably
changes in shape, though from Table 3 we note that the ﬁrst two moments
of the distribution do not change markedly.
We then attempted to generalize the model by assuming that both par-
ents drew from separate Beta distributions, though we were unsuccessful in
obtaining convergence in this case. Roughly speaking, allowing the distri-
bution of the mothers’ preference parameters to depend on two unknown
parameters asked too much of the data, especially given that the fathers’
preference parameter distribution was allowed to depend on two unrelated
parameters. We could only obtain convergence by restricting the mothers’
distribution to be indexed by one parameter, and thus adopted the power
function distribution assumption for their preference parameter draws. The
preference parameter densities for the two parents are plotted in Figures 5.c
and 5.d. Under this speciﬁcation, there is considerable mass close to the
value of 1 for the mothers. The mean αm for the mothers is estimated to
be .923 [from Table 3], though we hasten to point out the imprecision of
our estimate of this distribution.. While the point estimate of the power
function parameter is 11.941, the standard error is 9.553. This once again
illustrates the diﬃculty of precisely estimating this distribution when only
data on transfers are utilized. In any event, it is the case that the likelihood
value associated with speciﬁcation 4 is the lowest we obtained across the six
speciﬁcations estimated.17 For this reason, estimates from this speciﬁcation
continue to merit some attention.
The ﬁnal two speciﬁcations were estimated under the assumption that
the preference parameters were deterministic transformations of bivariate
normal random variates; the transformation mapped both normal random
variates into the unit interval. Given our experiences in estimating the
other speciﬁcations, we decided to estimate both these speciﬁcations under
the assumption that the marginal distributions of preference parameters for
the parents were identical. In speciﬁcation 5 we assume that the under-
lying normal random variables are independently distributed, while under
17The likelihood ratio test of speciﬁcation 4 against speciﬁcation 1 [with an associated
two restrictions] yields a test statistic of 10.472, which has a probability of .005 under the
null. The likelihood ratio test statistic of 4 versus 2 [with one restriction] is 8.19, which has
a probability value of .004 under the null. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 are not nested, since in
speciﬁcation 4, δ
2








f. Nevertheless, the log likelihood
associated with speciﬁcation 4 is considerably higher than the log likelihood associated
with speciﬁcation 3. In the policy experiment conducted below, we use estimates from
both speciﬁcations 3 and 4.
23speciﬁcation 6 we allow them to be dependent.
Since the marginal densities estimated under speciﬁcations 5 and 6 were
essentially identical, we only present the plot of the density associated with
speciﬁcation 5, which is exhibited in Figure 4.c. The shape of the density
is quite similar to that associated with the restricted Beta estimated in
speciﬁcation 3 [which appears in Figure 4.b]. The only major diﬀerence
in the two plots occurs around the value 1, where the density associated
with 5 is constrained to come down to 0. Apparently this characteristic
results in the transformed normals associated with speciﬁcations 5 and 6
ﬁtting the data less well than the Beta and even the one parameter power
function distribution [comparing the log likelihood values in Table 2]. When
we estimate the model allowing for dependence of the draws, our estimate of
the correlation coeﬃcient of the underlying normal random variates is .143,
though the standard error of the estimate is extremely large [.617]. This once
again seems to reﬂect the diﬃculty of identifying the preference parameter
distribution of the mothers, even though the marginal distributions have
been restricted to be the same. While it is possible that the preferences
of the divorced parents are independently distributed, one should probably
have access to data on child expenditures as well as transfers before seriously
trying to evaluate this hypothesis.
It is interesting to compare estimates of the fathers’ preference parameter
distribution from the noncooperative model presented in Del Boca and Flinn
(1995) with those obtained here. First note the stability of the estimates of
the ﬁrst two moments of the distribution of αf across the six speciﬁcations
[which are reported in Table 3]. The estimated means range from .750
to .775. In Del Boca and Flinn (1995), estimates of mean αf across four
model speciﬁcations ranged from .756 to .796. Thus both models seem to be
p i c k i n gu ps i m i l a rf e a t u r e si nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h ed a t a ,e v e nt h o u g ht h e
modelling framework itself is very diﬀerent. If one wanted to more formally
test between the two models, it seems that actual expenditure data would
be indispensable. We shall return to this point in the conclusion.
We end this section with a brief consideration of measures of ﬁt; since
compliance with orders is central to our model, characteristics of predicted
compliance probabilities on a case-by-case basis and over the sample are the
focus of attention. For each case in the sample we ﬁrst compute the predicted
probability of compliance given the cases characteristics (s,ym,y f) using the
estimated joint distributions of (αm,α f) from our six model speciﬁcations.
The expression used to compute this probability for each case is the term
which appears on the right-hand side of [22]. After computing this vector
24of probabilities, we did two things with it. The ﬁrst was to compute the
average in the sample, which, if the model is correctly speciﬁed, should equal
the observed proportion of individuals in the sample for which the transfer
is exactly equal to the order. The second exercise was an assessment of the
degree to which the expected probability of compliance was related to the
compliance outcome on a case-by-case basis. This was done by ﬁrst rank-
ordering the cases in terms of the predicted probability of compliance. We
took the 38 percent of the sample with the highest predicted probabilities
of compliance and denote these as predicted compliers.18 F o rt h es e to f
cases for which compliance was predicted, we computed the proportion of
cases for which compliance was observed. We also computed the number
of noncompliance outcomes over the set of predicted noncompliers, and the
total proportion of cases correctly classiﬁed.
The predicted proportion of cases in which compliance is observed in
the sample, 
 Pr(C), is given in Table 3. Since the actual proportion of com-
pliance cases is .38, we see that our speciﬁcations have underestimated the
sample proportion, though for some speciﬁcations the level of agreement is
relatively high [.337 for speciﬁcation 2 and .325 for speciﬁcation 4]. Since
the population probability of complying is not explicitly used in the esti-
mation and given the small sample size, we think the various speciﬁcations
have done a reasonably good job of approximating the sample proportion.
That said, the ability to predict compliance on the individual level based
on (s,ym,y f)i sn o tg o o d . ˆ C denotes the set of individuals who were pre-
dicted compliers, and Pr(C| ˆ C)d e n o t e st h ep r o p o r t i o no ft h i ss e tw h oa c -
tually complied. If membership in ˆ C and C were independent events, then
Pr(C| ˆ C)=Pr(C)=.38. Looking across the appropriate row in Table 3,
we see that the conditional probability is actually greater than .38 for all
the speciﬁcations, but never markedly so. The best speciﬁcation in terms of
this prediction criterion is 4, for which Pr(C| ˆ C)=.429. We also present the
proportion of the sample cases correctly classiﬁed. The highest proportion
of correct classiﬁcations is .568 [associated with speciﬁcation 4].
We don’t believe the low predictive power of the model at the individual
level is cause for undue concern for three reasons. First, the estimates used
in assessing goodness of ﬁt were not deﬁned so as to maximize predictive
accuracy in the manner we have examined it. If we were really concerned
with predicting compliance as well as possible, a maximum-score type of es-
18By taking the top 38 percent we forced the marginal predicted compliance distribution
to equal the marginal observed compliance distribution.
25timator should have been used. Second, based on past experience we know
that it is diﬃcult to predict discrete events using individual-level data. The
predictive accuracy we obtain is comparable to what researchers often realize
when studying the labor market participation decision of married women, for
example. Third, the presence of an institutional agent may make it diﬃcult
to predict individual level outcomes when conditioning on (s,ym,y f). For
example, if s were chosen by the institutional agent in a manner which re-
duces ex ante variability in the probability of cooperation, then the variance
in the predicted probabilities of cooperation may mainly be attributable to
sampling variability and minor forms of model misspeciﬁcation. In such a
case, which is not implausible, we should expect to ﬁnd little relationship
between compliance predictions and realizations.
In summary, we think that the model ﬁts the data acceptably well given
the parsimonious parameterization adopted and the rough agreement be-
tween our estimated preference parameter distributions and those obtained
from somewhat similar exercises, such as Weiss and Willis (1993) and Del
Boca and Flinn (1995). We now use these estimates to address an important
policy question, the eﬀect of increased enforcement on the distribution of
welfare in nonintact households.
6 Welfare Eﬀects of Perfect Enforcement
In the past few decades a number of proposals have been discussed and im-
plemented which were designed to increase the amount of money transferred
from noncustodial to custodial parents. For example, Chambers (1979) is
an inﬂuential book which in large part is devoted to the problem of enforce-
ment, the message being that tough criminal sanctions against noncomply-
ing noncustodial parents could prove to be eﬀective in inducing compliance.
Given the costliness of implementing such sanctions, and a debate over how
eﬀective they actually were in facilitating transfers, recently attention has
centered on more passive enforcement mechanisms such as mandatory with-
holding. Under mandatory withholding, a noncustodial parent with a child
support obligation has his obligation automatically deducted from his pay-
check on a regular basis. The deduction then makes its way to the custodial
parent.19
19Although it sounds as though mandatory withholding might lead to “perfect” com-
pliance, this is far from the case [see, e.g., Garﬁnkel and Klawitter (1990) and Del Boca
and Flinn (1994c)]. This seems largely due to the ability of parents under orders to hide
26While enforcement on the face of it seems unambiguously desirable from
a public policy perspective, in particular in terms of increasing the welfare of
children, in this section we show that this may not be the case. The intuition
for why a reallocation of income toward the mother may not increase expen-
ditures on the child in the model we have exposited is relatively immediate.
Mothers who want to receive a child support transfer greater than the non-
cooperative equilibrium transfer amount can only do so by spending more
on the public good than they would in noncooperative equilibrium. Roughly
speaking, when the order is guaranteed, mothers lose the incentive to spend
at the cooperative level. Moreover, the role of the institutional agent shifts
from focal arbitrator to income redistributor. The order changes from being
a suggested eﬃcient outcome when it lies in the “cooperation set” to the
starting point of a noncooperative game in which the parental income dis-
tribution has shifted from (ym,y f)t o( ym+s,yf −s). In the no-enforcement
environment, any transfer t ≥ 0 can be observed, and some of these trans-
fers are associated with cooperative equilibria [when t = s]; under perfect
enforcement, t ≥ s and cooperative equilibria never exist.
To consider the eﬀects of shifting from a nonenforcement regime to a
perfect enforcement regime of the type we have described, it will help to
think of a particular case characterized by the triple (s,ym,y f). In con-
sidering the eﬀect of shifting from the no-enforcement environment to the
perfect-enforcement environment Table 4 will prove useful; in this table we
characterize the change in child expenditures [when shifting between envi-
ronments] which is associated with pairs of transfer outcomes observed under
both environments. This amounts to an implicit partitioning of the prefer-
ence parameter space; within these partitions we can unambiguously sign
the eﬀect on child expenditures associated with switching environments. At
the end of this discussion we will be able to directly deﬁne the partition of
the (αm,α f) space on which we can derive unambiguous comparative statics
results.
E1 When there are no transfers under either environment, total expendi-
tures on the child are a ﬁxed proportion (1-αm) of the mother’s income.
Under perfect enforcement her income is ym+s as opposed to ym under
no enforcement, so ∆k>0.
E2 For a father to make no transfer under the no-enforcement environment,
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tαf ≥ yf/yt, and for him to make a transfer
their employment and income from administrative agencies.
27under perfect enforcement it must be the case that αf < (yf − s)/yt.
The set of αf for which these two conditions are satisﬁed is empty.
E3 Given that a positive transfer was made in a noncooperative equi-
librium under no enforcement, total expenditures on the child were
kN =( 1− αm)(1 − αf)yt. For the father to have made any transfer
in the no-enforcement environment, it must have been the case that
αf <y f/yt. Since he makes no [additional] transfer in the perfect-
enforcement environment, it must be the case that αf ≥ (yf − s)/yt.
Then the maximum expenditure on the child in the no-enforcement
environment is (1 − αm)(ym + s), which is the expenditure on the
child in the perfect-enforcement environment when the father makes
no additional transfer, implying that ∆k ≥ 0.
E4 When there exists a noncooperative equilibrium with positive transfers
from the father to the mother both before and after the income re-
distribution, we are in the environment described by Warr (1983) and
Bergstrom et al (1986). Income redistribution in noncooperative equi-
libria in which all agents make positive public good expenditures before
and after the redistribution produce identical levels of expenditure on
the public good. Therefore ∆k = 0 in this case.
E5 There are two situations to consider when there is cooperation initially
followed by a transfer equal to s under perfect enforcement. Say that
the noncooperative equilibrium which would have existed under no en-
forcement was characterized by a positive transfer on the part of the
father. Since the value of cooperation exceeded the value of noncoop-
eration we have
V C
f ≥ V N
f (27)







(1 − αm)(1 − αf)yt,
while in the noncooperative perfect-enforcement equilibrium with t = s
expenditures on the child are equal to (1−αm)(ym+s). Then the ratio
of no-enforcement to perfect-enforcement expenditures on the child is






1−αf (1 − αm)(1 − αf)yt
(1 − αm)(ym + s)
. (28)
Now for this case, αf ∈ [(yf − s)/yt,y f/yt); since the numerator of
[28] is an increasing function of αf, the minimum value R1(s)c a nt a k e







> 0 for all s, (29)
so that ∆k ≤ 0.
The other situation occurs when the noncooperative transfer level in
the no enforcement environment would have been 0. In this case, since
there was cooperation, we know that
V C









and that αf ≥ yf/yt. Since the expenditure under perfect enforcement
on the child is given by (1−αm)(ym+s), the ratio of child expenditures







1−αf (1 − αm)ym
(1 − αm)(ym + s)
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The right-hand side of [33] is an increasing function of s. At s =
0 it assumes the value 1. Thus ∆k ≤ 0 for this case as well, and
we have shown that when there are no additional transfers in the
perfect-enforcement equilibrium, parents who cooperated in the no-
enforcement environment will spend less on the child.
29E6 If the father would make additional transfers to the mother in the
perfect-enforcement environment, then in the noncooperative equilib-
rium which would have held under no enforcement he also would have
made positive transfers. Again using the results of Warr (1993) and
Bergstrom et al (1986), expenditures on the public good must be the
same before and after the income redistribution in the noncooperative
equilibrium. Since expenditures on the public good under cooperation
must have been greater in the no-enforcement environment, ∆k<0.
Now we can summarize our results in terms of partitions of the space
of (αm,α f)p a i r s .L e tQ1(s,ym,y f) be the set of preference parameters for
which perfect enforcement will lead to a gain in expenditures on the child.
These pairs are such that the father would make no additional transfer to
the mother in the perfect-enforcement environment and also do not belong
to the cooperation set, so Q1(s,ym,y f)=[ ( yf − s)/yt,1) ∩ ˜C(s,ym,y f),
where ˜C denotes the complement of C. On the set Q2(s,ym,y f)t h e r ei s
no change in expenditures on the child when we switch between the two
environments, and we have Q2(s,ym,y f)=( 0 ,(yf−s)/yt)∩˜C(s,ym,y f). We
have shown that anytime the parents were initially cooperating expenditures
on the child would fall when switching to perfect enforcement. Then the
set of preference pairs for which child expenditures unambiguously fall is
Q3(s,ym,y f)=C(s,ym,y f).
The conclusions of this discussion are illustrated in Figure 6, once again
where the arguments s, ym, and yf have been set at sample mean values.
The ﬁgure plots the surface of the change in expenditures on the child when
shifting from the no-enforcement equilibrium to the perfect enforcement one.
The grid superimposed on the ﬁgure is at height zero, indicating no change.
The set of points for which there is no change belong to Q2(s,ym,y f),
which appear on the right side of the plot. The part of the surface which
rises above the grid are associated with preference parameter pairs in the set
Q1(s,ym,y f). The largest gain in expenditures corresponds to the preference
pair (αm =1 ,α f =0 ) . In this case, the entire [enforced] transfer from the
father of 2.25 is spent on the child. The part of the surface which dips below
the grid is associated with points in the set Q3(s,ym,y f). We have already
show analytically that all points in Q3 must be associated with decreasing
expenditures on the child; in this example we see that these decreases can
be quite sizable. While the largest increase in k is 2.25, the largest decrease
in k is 3.15.
Since moving from no enforcement to perfect enforcement is associated
30with gains in child welfare in some cases and decreases in others, a nat-
ural question to ask is what the expected eﬀect is. To address this issue,
we use estimates of the distributions of parental preferences associated with
speciﬁcations 3 and 4. Using the estimated distributions, we computed the
expected expenditures on the child in the case of no enforcement and the
expected expenditure on the child in the noncooperative equilibrium associ-
ated with the income distribution (ym+s,yf−s) for each case in our sample.
The histogram of changes in expected expenditures on the child for the two
speciﬁcations are presented in Figure 7. Using the estimates from speci-
ﬁcation 3, in moving from the no-enforcement to the perfect-enforcement
equilibrium, the average gain in expected expenditures on the child is a rel-
atively modest .135 [which is $13.50]. For 43 percent of the cases, the switch
in environments was associated with a decrease in expected expenditures on
the child, though for some sample cases the gain in expenditures due to the
move to perfect enforcement was large [the maximum value in the sample is
2.41].
When the same exercise is repeated using the estimates from speciﬁca-
tion 4 the picture changes dramatically. The average change in expected
expenditures becomes -.134, which is again modest, though now 88 percent
of the cases experience a decline in expected expenditures. Most of these
changes are small however, and for some cases a large gain in expected ex-
penditures is observed once again [the maximum value of the change is 1.69
in this case].
The experiment we have conducted casts some doubt on the presump-
tion that increases in enforcement will necessarily lead to better welfare
outcomes for children. However, we should be quick to point out that the
exercise we have conducted is a very limited one. Most importantly, we
have looked at expenditure levels on the child when the size of the order
is held ﬁxed. It may or may not be the case that orders might be set very
diﬀerently in the two types of environments we have examined. We are not
able to speculate on how orders might change with the switch to a perfect-
enforcement environment since we are not able to empirically characterize
the utility functions of institutional agents.
It is of some interest to contrast the results of this exercise with a some-
what similar one conducted in Del Boca and Flinn (1995). In that model,
where divorced parents never exhibited cooperative behavior, increases in
enforcement activity lead to unambiguous increases in expenditures on the
child holding orders ﬁxed. Their empirical characterization of the prefer-
ences of institutional agents suggested that the net eﬀect on child expendi-
31tures would be small because institutional agents would reduce the order in
response to increased enforcement. Our model suggests a theoretically am-
biguous, but empirically small, eﬀect of changes in enforcement regimes on
child expenditures, but we are unable to suggest what the net eﬀect would be
because of the problem of identifying the preferences of institutional agents.
7 Conclusion
While individuals whose welfare is dependent upon the same public good
can be expected to appreciate the value of cooperation, the problem of
deciding upon a division of the surplus gained from cooperative behavior
is likely to be a severe deterrent to its implementation. This problem may
be especially severe in nonintact households, where divorced parents may
feel some antipathy toward one another. An institutional agent who is able
to suggest a speciﬁc cooperative solution to the public good problem can
lead divorced parents to equilibria which Pareto-dominate those which they
w o u l da t t a i ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fs u c ha na g e n t .S o m e w h a tp a r a d o x i c a l l y ,t h e
institutional agent can only play this role if her ability to implement child
support orders in the face of opposition by one or both parents is weak or
nonexistent. When the institutional agent has the power to fully implement
her orders, her ability to lead the parents to Pareto-improving equilibria is
eliminated, though she gains increased power to shift welfare toward the
parties to the divorce whom she favors.
This paper presents an attempt to estimate a model in which the form of
the interaction between divorced parents, cooperative or noncooperative, is
determined endogenously. The form the interaction takes in any particular
case depends on the parental income distribution, the preferences of the
parents regarding their own private consumption and the consumption of
the child, and, most interestingly, the child support order itself. In fact,
one can show that any pair of parents, no matter what their incomes and
preferences, would choose to cooperate at some child support order level.
It is interesting to note that parents may not cooperate not only because
orders are too high, but also because they are too low.
We provide some evidence that the model is roughly able to reproduce
the data at our disposal, and perform a comparative statics exercise that
provides a cautionary tale regarding the presumed beneﬁt of increases in
enforcement activity on the welfare of children. In order to diﬀerentiate
between the large number of behavioral models which may be developed
32to explain interactions between divorced parents, information on the vector
(ym,y f,k,t,s) is required. For example, in the model considered in this




αf −αm)yf +( 1− αm)ym +( 1− αm
αf )t (αm,α f) ∈ C(s,ym,y f)
(1 − αm)(ym + t)( αm,α f) / ∈ C(s,ym,y f)
By contrast, the model estimated in Del Boca and Flinn (1995) implies that
k =( 1− αm)(ym + t) for all values of t. This clear diﬀerence in the child
good expenditure functions under the two models is easily testable given
access to (ym,y f,k,t,s).20 Aside from model testing, which is clearly criti-
cal given the sensitivity of policy implications to behavioral speciﬁcations,
access to more complete data is required in order to adequately estimate
any given model. This is clear from our experiences with the estimation
of the joint distribution of parental preferences. In the one speciﬁcation
estimated which allowed for dependence between αm and αf, the estimates
obtained suggested weak dependence. While it may be the case that there is
little dependence between the preference parameters of divorced parents, it
is at least equally possible that this result is a consequence of the tenuous-
ness of the identiﬁcation of the parameters characterizing the distribution
of the mother’s preference parameter. Heuristically speaking, this is due to
the fact that we observe the endogenous variable chosen by the father (t)
but not the one set by the mother (k). What we learn about the mother’s
preference parameter comes from its rather “indirect” eﬀect on the father’s
transfer choice.
In spite of these limitations, the model does provide a coherent explana-
tion of the empirical relationship between child support orders and transfers
and the parental income distribution. The policy experiment conducted de-
livers an important message regarding the possible eﬀects of increasing child
support enforcement activities on the welfare of children.
20Del Boca and Flinn (1994b) and Hernandez et al. (1992), using expenditure data
from households headed by divorced mothers and data on the educational attainment of
children of divorced parents, respectively, provide some evidence not inconsistent with this
implication. In the data sets utilized in both papers, information on the child support
order and the income of the noncustodial parent is not available, making the conclusions
reached less than deﬁnitive.
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35Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable All t =0 0<t<s t= st > s
t 1.48 0 1.98 2.30 3.06
(1.70) (1.45) (1.48) (1.92)
s 2.25 2.12 2.57 [same] 2.11
(1.49) (1.54) (1.53) (1.24)
ym 5.56 5.36 5.17 5.94 5.38
(2.56) (2.24) (2.51) (2.86) (2.50)
yf 11.46 11.25 10.38 11.71 12.74
(8.76) (7.68) (3.89) (6.59) (18.63)
N 222 83 31 84 24
Proportion .37 .14 .38 .11
36Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Preference Distributions
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Speciﬁcation
P a r a m e t e r s 123456
Power p.d.f.
























ln L -358.463 -357.322 -356.479 -353.227 -358.841 -358.672
37Table 3
Evaluation of Behavioral Models
Speciﬁcation
S t a t i s t i c 123456
αm .751 .836 .767 .923 .774 .774
αf .751 .750 .767 .775 .774 .774
SD(αm) .193 .139 .203 .072 .204 .206
SD(αf) .193 .194 .203 .209 .204 .206

 Pr(C) .314 .337 .293 .325 .316 .306
Pr(C| ˆ C) .393 .393 .405 .429 .417 .417
Pr(N| ˆ N) .630 .630 .638 .652 .645 .645
Prop. Correct .541 .541 .545 .568 .559 .559
38Table 4
Enforcement, Transfers, and Child Expenditures
Perfect Enforcement
No Enforcement t = st > s
t =0 ∆k>0 not possible
[E1] [E2]
t>0,t= s ∆k ≥ 0∆ k =0
[E3] [E4]
t = s ∆k ≤ 0∆ k<0
[Cooperation] [E5] [E6]
39